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THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUTTA
HERE! MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL CITIES’
POTENTIAL TO BRING UNFAIR AND
DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICE CLAIM IN
THE FACE OF MLB CONTRACTION
MICHAEL VIVERITO

INTRODUCTION
It seems like something straight out of Hollywood. The world has shut down,
businesses have closed their doors, and people have been encouraged, and, in
most cases, instructed to stay at home.1 In the wake of the novel COVID-19
global pandemic, sports have become a past memory, rather than a present
reality, as hundreds of sporting events across the world have been postponed or
canceled.2 As the world wages its war against an unseen enemy, there persists
another major battle behind the scenes in professional baseball; one not at the
forefront of the news as of late, but nonetheless poised to have drastic
implications for cities across the United States.
In the minds of most communities around the world, one of the most
important assets it can possess is a local professional sports franchise. After a
city and an owner pour resources into the construction and maintenance of
professional sports venues, they expect to see a return on their investment.

May 2020 graduate of Marquette University Law School with a Sports Law Certificate from the National
Sports Law Institute. 2018-2019 member of the Marquette Sports Law Review. B.A. Sports Communication
and Spanish Language, magna cum laude, 2017, Bradley University. This Article was written for an
assignment in Professor Paul M. Anderson’s Sports Law Seminar Course and it was selected as the winner of
the 2020 National Sports Law Student Writing Competition. He would like to thank Professor Anderson for
all of his research suggestions and thoughtful edits throughout the writing process that helped get this paper
to its final form. He also wants to thank his parents for their continued support throughout his academic career.
1
See Kaleigh Rogers, Why Did the World Shut Down for COVID-19 but Not Ebola, SARS or Swine Flu?,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Apr. 14, 2020), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-did-the-world-shut-down-forcovid-19-but-not-ebola-sars-or-swine-flu/; See also Sarah Mervosh, Denise Lu & Vanessa Swales, See Which
States and Cities Have Told Residents to Stay at Home, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-stay-at-home-order.html.
2
See Coronavirus Cancellations and Reactions in Sports, ESPN (Apr. 24, 2020),
https://www.espn.com/espn/story/_/id/28871525/coronavirus-cancellations-reactions-sports.
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However, in the eyes of some, a local professional sports franchise can be a
cumbersome detriment. Take Minor League Baseball (“MiLB”), for example.
When it comes to the minor leagues, MiLB and Major League Baseball
(“MLB”) have staunch disagreements over its necessity and purpose.
The economics of MiLB are unusual and, as such, have led to a bifurcated
arrangement between MiLB and MLB regarding finances involved in the
operation of the minor leagues.3 As part of this agreement, MLB teams pay the
salaries of their minor league affiliate’s players through affiliation contracts,4
also known as Player Development Contracts (“PDC”).5 Concurrently, MiLB
team owners are responsible for field maintenance and operation, team
equipment, including uniforms and other “non-personnel operations.”6 This
arrangement, however, has led MLB and MiLB to butt heads over the financial
burden the other poses. MLB believes that it pours “hundreds of millions of
dollars” into what, in their eyes, is “an unprofitable enterprise” on expenses that
primarily only benefit the minor leagues.7 Conversely, MiLB is unhappy with
the millions of dollars it devotes to the instruction and development of tens of
thousands of players for MLB action as required by a PDC.8
In recent months, the two leagues have been scuffling over the finances
associated with MiLB, particularly the payment of players’ salaries. Tensions
have reached a boiling point, as MLB now threatens forty-two MiLB teams with
losing their major league affiliation as part of its initiative to contract the minor
leagues in an effort to limit operating costs.9 Cities currently home to minor
league teams, as well as those looking to attract team teams, now look for relief
in the face of MLB contraction. Because MiLB and MLB work together, MLB
is an authoritative voice to which MiLB, and its respective cities, look to for
guidance in conforming to MLB’s standards and requirements for sustaining an
affiliated team.
Accordingly, if a major league team wants its minor league affiliate’s field
to have a similar layout, or match the dimensions of the field where the bigleague ball club plays, that hardship falls on the team owner and city to
accomplish that feat by pouring resources into the construction of a park in
compliance with the major league team’s request. These cities rely on MLB’s
word that an affiliated team, rather than an independent league team, will play

3
Michael McCann, Save the Spinners: How One Town Attempts to Stave Off MLB's Contractual Plan for
the Minors, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.si.com/mlb/2020/01/08/save-the-lowellspinners-controversial-plan-for-milb.
4
Id.
5
See Player Development Contracts, MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, https://www.milb.com/about/pdc (last
visited Mar. 29, 2020).
6
McCann, supra note 3.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.

VIVERITO– ARTICLE 31.1

12/17/2020 8:51 PM

2020] MINOR L EAGUE CIT IES & FT CA SECT ION 5 CL AIMS 87
at that stadium if the necessary measures are taken.10 Thus, in light of MiLB
and its respective cities’ reliance on MLB guidance and dictation, there exists a
potential claim of unfair or deceptive trade practices as a possibility for relief.
This article will examine United States federal law on unfair and deceptive
trade practices in an effort to analyze the potential for MiLB cities to bring legal
claims against MLB in light of contraction of the minor leagues. First, Part I
will explain the affiliation between MiLB and MLB before moving on to the
current state of relations between the two leagues, including background on the
main lawsuit central to this issue, as well as proposed legislation enacted by
government officials. Part I will conclude by identifying the MLB
commissioner’s “best interest power,” which, while powerful within the game
of baseball, is largely symbolic and holds little-to-no legal effect, meaning it
would be defeated by any legal claim brought against it. Next, Part II of this
article will provide a detailed analysis of the elements required to establish
liability under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act11 for an unfair or
deceptive trade practice claim. Part III will examine prior case law to identify
comparable factual scenarios before applying the law to a fictitious city in order
to weigh its potential to bring a claim under Section 5. Finally, this article will
conclude that, through a Section 5 analysis and prior case law review, a city
would likely have standing to raise a lawsuit against MLB based on unfair or
deceptive trade practices.
I. THE SCOUTING REPORT
This section will introduce readers to former general manager Branch Rickey
and explain how he revolutionized the minor leagues into what they are today.
The relationship between the major-and-minor leagues exists through PDCs, an
agreement between both leagues, giving both certain obligations to fulfill.
Then, this section will present the reader with the legal saga created by the
lawsuit of a former minor league player that led to the Save America’s Pastime
Act (“SAPA”) and MLB’s exemption from federal labor laws. Finally, the
reader will learn about the “best interest power,” held only by the commissioner,
and its viability as an available defense to MLB in its present legal battle.

10
Cf. Ballpark Digest Editors, 2019 Affiliated Attendance by Average, BALLPARK DIGEST (Sept. 9, 2019),
https://ballparkdigest.com/2019/09/09/2019-affiliated-attendance-by-average/ (League leading total
attendance was 650,934 in 70 games, with an average of just under 9,300 fans per game); and Kevin Richard,
2019 Independent Baseball Attendance by Average, BALLPARK DIGEST (Sept. 23, 2019),
https://ballparkdigest.com/2019/09/23/2019-independent-baseball-attendance-by-average/ (Comparable total
attendance for 69 games was 344, 641, with an average of 5,385 fans per game).
11
See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2020).
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However, it will be demonstrated that this power has little-to-no legal relevance
when applied to the issue at focus in this article.
A. An Overview of MiLB
Even before minor league affiliation came about, a league separate from the
major leagues had existed since 1901 with the formation of the National
Association of Professional Baseball Leagues (“NAPBL”) in September of that
year.12 Today, there are 160 MiLB teams dispersed throughout 17 different
leagues around the United States, Canada, and the Dominican Republic.13 Fullseason minor league teams play a 140-game regular season from April to
September, in addition to added time for spring training and the playoffs.14
These teams are colloquially referred to as the “farm systems” for their MLB
parent club because of their purpose to foster players in an effort to make them
ready and capable for big-league action.15 In the early years of the NAPBL’s
existence, major league teams did not utilize the existing league as a way to
foster and develop players for use at the major league level. That changed in
1919 with then general manager of the St. Louis Cardinals, Branch Rickey,
whose plan for a “farm system” called for Cardinal-owned teams at various
minor league levels to develop players that would help the major league team.16
This was only a plan in theory, however, as major league teams could neither
purchase nor own a minor league team. As luck would have it, the new National
Association Agreement was signed in 1921, which permitted major league
organizations to own minor league teams.17 Shortly thereafter, Rickey
purchased three minor league teams to affiliate them with the big-league club
and began loading them with talent to train and develop.18
Today, this affiliation is codified in the official MLB rulebook as Rule 56,
which states, in part, “[F]or any Major League Club and any Minor League Club
. . . to establish or maintain any form of working agreement or other contractual
relationship, they both must sign a standard form letter . . . binding them both to
the terms and conditions of the standard Player Development Contract . . . .”19
12
The History & Function of Minor League Baseball, MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL,
http://www.milb.com/milb/history/general_history.jsp (last visited Apr. 7, 2020) (“The National Association
of Professional Baseball Leagues, [is] now known as Minor League Baseball . . . .”).
13
About, MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, https://www.milb.com/about (last visited Mar. 29, 2020).
14
See Minor League Baseball, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minor_League_Baseball (last
visited Mar. 29, 2020).
15
Id. (stating that the “farm” comparison came from MLB players in the 1930 who joked that minor league
teams were “growing players down on the farm like corn”).
16
Pat Doyle, Branch Rickey’s Farm, BASEBALL-ALMANAC, https://www.baseball-almanac.com/minorleague/minor2005a.shtml (last visited Mar. 29, 2020).
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
The Official Professional Baseball Rules Book, MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, RULE 56 (2019),
https://registration.mlbpa.org/pdf/MajorLeagueRules.pdf.
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Players are then sent a Uniform Player Contract (“UPC”), which lays out the
terms of their employment with their parent ball club.20 This creates a
relationship between the player and the parent organization for seven years
whereby the player remains subject to the major league club’s instructions yearround, both in-season as well as during the offseason.21 Additionally, the PDC
is the only working agreement permitted between MiLB and MLB.22 Thus, the
PDC creates certain obligations for both MLB organizations and their affiliates’
players through the duration of the contractual relationship.
MiLB franchise ownership is charged with assembling a front office and staff
to manage all business aspects, including gameday operations, which amount to
ticket sales, promotion, and broadcasting, in addition to others.23 This allows
MiLB teams to take in revenue from several different streams locally.24 MLB
parent clubs, in turn, make all decisions related to roster assignment, coaching
staff, and player development for each MiLB team it holds a PDC with. 25 Most
importantly in the scope of this article, major league clubs are responsible for
the “payment of all obligations to or for the benefit of” minor league ball
players.26
Most MiLB franchise owners are private individuals or ownership groups,
while construction, ownership, and management of baseball stadiums are left to
local municipalities.27 To put the cost of constructing a stadium into
perspective, the Houston Astros’ Class A-Advanced affiliate, the Fayetteville
Woodpeckers, saw the city of Fayetteville, Arkansas spend $37.8 million on its
new stadium that opened in 2019. 28 In High Point, North Carolina, the city
constructed BB&T Point, the $36 million stadium 29 where the High Point
Rockers, a team in the independent league of unaffiliated baseball, play their

20
See, e.g., MINOR LEAGUE UNIFORM PLAYER CONTRACT (2020), https://ipmall.law.unh.edu/content/unhsports-law-repository-contracts-uniform-contracts (last visited Apr. 6, 2020).
21
Id.
22
The Official Professional Baseball Rules Book, supra note 19, at Rule 56(a).
23
Player Development Contracts, supra note 5.
24
Anne Wall, Sports Marketing and the Law: Protecting Proprietary Interests in Sports Entertainment
Events, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L. J. 77, 95 (1996) (“Local revenues generated and maintained at the club . . . level
include: (1) local television broadcasts made into the team’s ‘home territory;’ (2) local radio broadcasts; (3)
season, group and individual ticket sales; (4) luxury box rental and preferred seating; (5) signage; (6) program
sales; (7) local promotions; (8) concession; (9) parking; and (10) participant entry fees”); See also David
Broughton, MiLB, Teams Had Record Merchandising Sales in 2018, SPORTS BUS. J. (Jul. 8, 2019),
https://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2019/07/08/Research-and-Ratings/MiLBmerchandise.aspx. (stating that all 160 clubs across MiLB brought in a combined $73.9 million in
merchandising sales, which was up 4% from 2017.).
25
Player Development Contracts, supra note 5.
26
The Official Professional Baseball Rules Book, supra note 19, at Rule 56(g)(5)(A).
27
Player Development Contracts, supra note 5.
28
Monica Vendituoli, Baseball Stadium Budget Set at $37.8 Million, THE FAYETTEVILLE OBSERVER (Mar.
19, 2018), https://www.fayobserver.com/news/20180319/baseball-stadium-budget-set-at-378-million.
29
Lloyd Whittington, High Point Baseball Stadium has a Name, TRIAD BUS. J. (Apr. 12, 2018),
https://www.bizjournals.com/triad/news/2018/04/12/high-point-baseball-stadium-has-a-name.html.
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home games.30 Prince William County in Virginia, where the former Potomac
Nationals played their games, brought a public referendum to identify the source
of funding for the construction of a new $35 million stadium that was to replace
the current diminishing venue.31 The Pawtucket Red Sox wanted to do even
more, this time asking fans for public funds to help construct a new $83 million
stadium in 2017.32 In the financial breakdown of the bill for this proposed
stadium the Triple-A team of the Boston Red Sox would be personally on the
hook for $45 million, whereas the city and state, Pawtucket, Rhode Island,
would both contribute a combined $38 million. 33 Cities dedicate absorbent
financial resources to stadiums that may be filled one year and vacant the next.
Take the Pawtucket Red Sox in the example above; playing in Pawtucket, Rhode
Island one year and Worcester, Massachusetts the next, where the city has a
planned $100 million at its disposal to finance the new Polar Park.34
This article will now explain the current state of affairs in the relationship
between MiLB and MLB. As Part II will demonstrate, that relationship is now
being tested like never before, especially with the looming threat of MLB
contraction and the upcoming expiration of the current operating agreement
between MiLB and MLB at the conclusion of the 2020 season.35
B. Current State of Relations
Babe Ruth, Hank Aaron, Sandy Koufax, Ernie Banks, Mike Trout; these
names all are synonymous with the game of baseball. Fans attribute the names
to what the individuals holding them accomplished on the field during their
careers. Aaron Senne is not a name one associates with baseball, nor is it one
someone would hear and stop to think twice about. Yet, in the coming years, it
is possible that Aaron Senne becomes a name that, like those mentioned above,
is forever linked with baseball history. In this instance, however, the name will
be linked to what a player has accomplished off the field, rather than his
successes on it. For Aaron Senne, his legacy will be having given minor
leaguers a voice in the game of finances played by MiLB and MLB.

30
Eric Boehm, These Three Cities Spent $70 Million on Stadiums to Lure Minor League Baseball Teams.
They All Struck Out., REASON (Apr. 1, 2019), https://reason.com/2019/04/01/70-million-minor-leaguestadium-fail/.
31
Jenna West, Are Minor League Parks a Bad Deal for Cities?, USA TODAY (Aug. 22, 2017),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/mlb/2017/08/22/minor-league-parks-bad-deal-cities/591770001/.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Paul Burton, Worcester Expects to Borrow $32 Million for Ballpark Overruns, THE BOND BUYER (Jan.
14, 2020), https://www.bondbuyer.com/news/worcester-expects-to-borrow-32-million-for-ballpark-overruns.
35
Neil deMause, Why MLB Declared War on The Minor Leagues, SLATE (Dec. 19, 2019),
https://slate.com/culture/2019/12/mlb-minor-league-baseball-contraction-kill-milb-teams-collusion.html.
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Aaron Senne was drafted three times as an amateur, once in high school, and
twice in college.36 The third and final time, Senne signed with the Florida
Marlins after being selected in the tenth round of the 2010 MLB Amateur
Draft.37 Senne had an uninspiring minor league career, batting only .279 in 152
games over a three-year career, never making it past Class A-Advanced.38
While in the minor league system, Senne had first-hand experience with the
working conditions imposed upon minor leaguers during the season and what
the parent clubs expected from players in their development during the
offseason. Players work fifty to seventy hours per week during a five-month
season, not including spring training,39 a camp held annually during the early
months of the year in Florida and Arizona by each club before the official start
of the regular season. Players in rookie ball and Class A receive minimum
monthly salaries of $1,100, while players in Double-A and Triple-A earn $1,500
and $2,150 per month respectively.40 Thus, many minor leaguers earn wages
that place them at or below the federal poverty line.41 Compare that with the
comfortable MLB minimum salary, $555,000 in 2019, and it is quite obvious
why minor leaguers want to see some change when it comes to the payment for
their services.42
In February 2014, Senne commenced an action against the Office of the
Commissioner of Baseball (the “Senne suit”).43 Dubbed a “‘first-of-its-kind’
challenge to MLB’s minor league pay practices,”44 the principle point asserted
was that MLB violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) by, “failing to
pay minor league players in accordance with federal minimum-wage and
overtime rules during the regular season,” and by, “failing to pay these same
players anything at all for their participation in spring training, fall instructional
leagues, and mandatory off-season workout programs.”45 In its brief history,
the Senne suit’s existence has been tumultuous, going from certification in
36
Aaron Senne, BASEBALL REFERENCE, https://www.baseball-reference.com/register/player.fcgi?id=senne-001aar (last
visited Apr. 6, 2020).
37
Id.
38
See Id.
39
Theodore McDowell, Changing the Game: Remedying the Deficiencies of Baseball’s Antitrust
Exemption in the Minor Leagues, 9 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 1, 2 (2018).
40
Ronald Blum, Baseball Players in Minors to Lose Minimum Wage Protection, ASSOC. PRESS NEWS
(Mar. 23, 2018), https://apnews.com/cb183f59e88948e8b9cd49ad07bde807/Baseball-players-in-minors-tolose-minimum-wage-protection.
41
Nathaniel Grow, The Save America’s Pastime Act: Special-Interest Litigation Epitomized, 90 U. COLO.
L. REV. 1013, 1014 (2019). See generally 2018 Poverty Guidelines, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATION, https://aspe.hhs.gov/2018-poverty-guidelines (last visited Apr. 6, 2020)
(stating that the federal poverty line for single-person households in 2018 was $12,140).
42
Scott Boeck, MLB Salaries: The All-Near-League Minimum Team, USA TODAY (Mar. 29, 2019),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/mlb/2019/03/29/mlb-salaries-league-minimumbaseball/3306763002/.
43
Grow, supra note 41, at 1016–17.
44
Id. at 1017.
45
Id.
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October 2015, to decertification in July 2016, back to certification in March
2017.46 In August 2019, the Ninth Circuit heard the case, affirming class
certification and remanding it back to the California district court with further
instructions relating to choice of law for the certified class.47
As of the time of this writing, the suit has not been argued on its merits, and
judicial treatment of the issues has been unpredictable at best.48 During early
litigation, however, MLB argued two key defenses – the Seasonal Amusement
and Recreation Establishment Defenses and the Creative Professional
Exemption.49 These defenses argue the nature and business of MLB cause it to
be exempted from FLSA compliance.50 Because the issue of FLSA exemption
is both a present and future problem, coupled with the uncertainty of how a court
will rule on the merits of the Senne suit, MLB looked “to find other mechanisms
through which it could insulate its minor league pay practices from legal
challenge under the FLSA.”51
In 2016, the Save America’s Pastime Act (“SAPA”) was first introduced by
Rep. Brett Guthrie of Kentucky and Rep. Cheri Bustos of Illinois, 52 exempting
MLB from the minimum wage and overtime hours language contained in the
Fair Labor Standards Act.53 This legislation was initially broad, applying to
“any employee” who held a contract with an affiliated team to play baseball at
the minor league level and completely excluded minor league baseball players
from the minimum wage and overtime laws contained in the FLSA.54 In the
eyes of the public, however, this was another example of a multi-billion dollar
corporation looking to minimize payments to employees, while increasing their
hours of labor. As one author put it, “[t]he prospect of Congress passing a
legislative exemption shielding MLB . . . from the legal obligation to pay some
of its employees the minimum wage triggered a wave of outcry . . . .” 55 Criticism
over the SAPA and the public backlash it received caused the bill to wilt away
in the House of Representatives throughout the remaining term of the 114th
Congress.56

46

McDowell, supra note 39, at 14.
Senne v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp., 934 F.3d 918, 950 (9th Cir. 2019); See also Maury Brown,
Court Ruling Allows Minor League Baseball Players to Seek Wage Increase as Class Action, FORBES (Aug.
16,
2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown/2019/08/16/court-ruling-allows-minor-leaguebaseball-players-to-seek-wage-increase-as-class-action/#1ff2e8077fed (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s
decision to affirm and remand back to the Northern District of California).
48
McDowell, supra note 39, at 13.
49
Senne v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp., 315 F.R.D. 523, 579-80 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
50
Id.
51
Grow, supra note 41, at 1023.
52
McCann, supra note 3.
53
H.R. 5580, 114th Cong. (2016).
54
See id.
55
Grow, supra note 41, at 1026.
56
Id. at 1028.
47
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It was not until 2018 that the SAPA saw light again. This time, the language
contained a slightly more tailored exemption than its predecessor.57 Under the
bill, a minor league baseball player would be exempt from additional pay
requirements only if his weekly salary was greater than the current equivalent
of a minimum wage forty–hour work week during the championship season (not
to include the off season or spring training).58 That is to say, so long as players
earned a minimum salary of at least $290 per week during the 2018
championship season, they would not be entitled to any additional
compensation, overtime or otherwise, even if they worked more than forty hours
in a single week.59 However, there was one notable difference between the 2016
and 2018 versions of the SAPA. The 2016 version included language that would
have negated the claims raised in the Senne suit.60 That language was removed
in the 2018 version, thus preserving the issues maintained by the suit.61 On
March 23, 2018, President Donald Trump signed into law Congress’s $1.3
trillion omnibus spending legislation, codifying MLB’s labor laws exemption.62
This is not the first statutory exemption enjoyed by MLB, however. In the
1922 landmark Supreme Court case, Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v.
National League of Professional Base Ball Clubs, 63 Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes held that the business of baseball was purely state affairs, and thus not
interstate commerce.64 Through this holding, Justice Holmes effectively created
MLB’s antitrust exemption.65 This exemption has stood the test of time,
remaining intact through several judicial challenges.66 In addition to both the
antitrust and FLSA exemptions, the judicial system has also faced another
pressing issue – one not just inherent to baseball.

57

Id. at 1029.
H.R. 1625, 115th Cong. § 201 (2018).
59
Grow, supra note 41, at 1029.
60
H.R. 5580, 114th Cong. § 2(b) (2016) (subsection (f) is amended to state, “In any action or proceeding
commenced before, on, or after the date of enactment . . . .”).
61
H.R. 1625, 115th Cong. § 201(b) (2018) (title takes effect the date upon which the law is enacted).
62
See Mike Murphy, Here’s Why These Baseball Players May Suffer from the $1.3 Trillion Spending Bill,
MARKETWATCH (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/heres-why-these-baseball-playersmay-strike-out-if-congress-passes-the-spending-bill-2018-03-22.
63
Fed. Baseball Club of Balt. v. Nat’l League of Pro. Base Ball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
64
Id. at 208-09.
65
See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2020) (“Every contact, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”
(emphasis added)).
66
See Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (stating that pursuant to the decision in Federal
Baseball Club, “Congress had no intention of including the business of baseball within the scope of the Federal
antitrust laws”); See also Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (stating that while the Court ruled that baseball
is, in fact, “engaged in interstate commerce,” baseball’s antitrust exemption will persist nonetheless because
of its longevity and the Court’s respect for stare decisis, and will continue to apply solely to baseball).
58
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C. The Commissioner’s “Best Interests” Power
In 1921, with newly appointed MLB Commissioner Kennesaw Mountain
Landis at the helm of the league, team owners signed the National Agreement,
also referred to as the Major League Agreement, which defined and preserved
the authority of the MLB commissioner.67 Within this document was language
granting the commissioner broad power “[t]o investigate either upon complaint
or upon his own initiative, any act, transaction or practice charged, alleged or
suspected to be detrimental to the best interests of the national game of base ball
[sic]. . . .”68 After Landis’ death in 1944, the scope of the “best interests” powers
was narrowed with the inclusion of Article I, Section 3: “No Major League Rule
or other joint action of the [American and National Leagues], and no action or
procedure taken in compliance with any such Major League Rule or joint action
of the [American and National Leagues] . . . shall be considered or construed to
be detrimental to Baseball.”69 Additionally, this amendment to the original
National Agreement eliminated the clubs’ right of judicial recourse to challenge
a decision by the commissioner.70 In 1964, after Commissioner Ford Frick’s
retirement, the agreement was amended once more to restore the club’s right to
judicial recourse.71 The agreement was later renamed the Major League
Baseball Constitution in 2000, but the nature and scope of the commissioner’s
“best interests” powers has remained substantively the same since the 1964
amendment.72
Perhaps the most notable case in which the Court has addressed the
commissioner’s “best interests” power is Charles O. Finely & Co. v. Kuhn.73
Here, the Seventh Circuit upheld that Commissioner Bowie Kuhn’s rejection
of the Oakland Athletics’ assignment of three player contracts to the Boston Red
Sox and New York Yankees as, “inconsistent with the best interests of baseball,
the integrity of the game and the maintenance of public confidence in it.” 74 In
its decision, the Court concluded that Commissioner Kuhn, after investigation,
consultation, and deliberation, acted in good faith in a manner he determined to
be in the best interests of baseball, and, further, that whether he was right or
wrong in his decision was beyond the competence and jurisdiction of the

67
See Ted Curtis, In the Best Interests of the Game: The Authority of the Commissioner of Major League
Baseball, 5 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 5, 7-8 (1995).
68
1921 Major League Agreement, Article I, Section 2(a), ROADSIDEPHOTOS,
http://roadsidephotos.sabr.org/baseball/1921MLAgree.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2020).
69
Allan H. (“Bud”) Selig & Matthew J. Mitten, Baseball Jurisprudence: Its Effect on America’s Pastime
and Other Professional Sports Leagues, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1171, 1173 (2018).
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 1174.
73
Charles O. Finely & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978).
74
Id. at 531.
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Court.75 To reinforce its decision, the Court followed up by stating that when
baseball selected Kennesaw Mountain Landis, a federal judge, as its first
commissioner, “it intended only him and not the judiciary as a whole to be its
umpire and governor.”76 This small but powerful statement shows that the
courts intended to stay out of the game of baseball and leave its governance and
rule enforcement to the league itself.
The MLB commissioner generally has broad discretion when it comes to his
“best interests” power, and courts will usually provide “substantial deference”
to the commissioner’s final judgment.77 Interestingly, though, in the last few
sentences of the opinion, the Court appears to place a limit on the
commissioner’s powers by stating that judicial intervention is appropriate in
certain circumstances when “the rules, regulations, or judgments . . . are in
[direct] contravention to the laws of the land or in [complete] disregard of the
charter or bylaws of the [NAPBL] and where the [NAPBL] has failed to follow
the basic [freedom] of due process of law.”78 Thus, courts recognize and enforce
limits on the “best interests” power with contractual, due process, and public
law disputes.79
As an example, in 1976, Commissioner Kuhn revoked the first round
selection of the Atlanta Braves in the upcoming January 1977 amateur draft
because of two counts of tampering that violated the Major League Rules.80 In
its analysis of the legal implication of revoking Atlanta’s draft pick, the Court
inquired into the applicability of the Major League Agreement, which
enumerated the punitive measures the commissioner may take, and found that
revocation of a draft pick was not one of the measures specifically enumerated
by the language of the agreement.81 What this demonstrates is that the
commissioner’s “best interests” power is not the end all, be all when it comes to
its enforcement.
Thus, while the commissioner’s “best interests” power is valid, enforceable,
and carries weight through judicial deference, there are certain situations in
which the judiciary will intervene and contradict the commissioner’s verdict,
75

Id. at 539.
Id. at 537.
77
Selig & Mitten, supra note 69, at 1174.
78
Finely, 569 F.2d at 544.
79
Selig & Mitten, supra note 69 at 1175; see Finely, 569 F.2d at 544 n.65 (stating that while issuing
disciplinary authority pursuant to his “best interests” power, the commissioner’s process and reason behind
the implementation of discipline “must not be a sham designed merely to give colorable proprietary to an
inadequate process”).
80
Atlanta Nat’l League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213, 1216–17 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
81
Id. at 1223. (stating that the commissioner has the following remedial measures at his disposal: “(a) a
reprimand; (b) deprivation of a Major League Club of representation in joint meetings; (c) suspension or
removal of any officer or employee of a Major League or a Major League Club; (d) temporary or permanent
ineligibility of a player; and (e) a fine, not to exceed Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) in the case of a Major
League Club and not to exceed Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) in the case of any officer, employee or
player”).
76
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especially when the suggested remedial measure is not enumerated in the Major
League Baseball Constitution, thus making the power largely “a symbolic
hammer.”82 In application to the focus of this article – MLB contraction of
MiLB teams – and following the footsteps of Atlanta National League Baseball
Club, Inc. and the final sentences of the Finely decision, it is more likely that
the commissioner’s “best interests” power would be defeated via judiciary
intervention because contraction is not an enumerated power available to the
commissioner and, consequently, will not be addressed further in this article.
II. THE DRAFT: SELECTING THE LAW
Sports provide a sense of comfort and relief from the stresses that
continually arise in everyday life. People eagerly anticipate the opportunity to
get lost in their favorite teams when game time rolls around. Athletes become
more than people playing a game; they become idols. Fans purchase player
merchandise, team apparel, tickets, and, when inside stadiums and arenas, food
and beverage. With this in mind, it is not hard to understand that the “business
of professional sports is driven by sports consumers.”83 Accordingly, when
certain actions taken by an individual player or team “strike a particularly unfair
chord,” many fans feel that their stake is legally cognizable.84
While the states have individually codified their own unfair competition and
deceptive trade practice statutes, this article will address solely the federal
statute, the Federal Trade Commission Act Section 5 (“Section 5”),85 so as to
keep uniformity in its analysis. The primary purpose of this federal statute is to
“protect the consumer public, rather than to punish the wrongdoer.”86 Section
5 has long prohibited “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”87
Additionally, Section 5 empowers the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) to
prevent certain entities from engaging in behavior that constitutes “unfair or
deceptive acts or practices.”88
Only the FTC is authorized by statute to bring challenges under Section 5.89
When faced with an unfairness claim, the FTC must consider three factors in
82
Howard Bryant, Bud Selig’s Best Interests in Alex Rodriguez Case, ESPN (Aug. 14, 2013),
https://www.espn.com/mlb/story/_/id/9568200/bud-selig-best-interests-alex-rodriguez-case (discussing Alex
Rodriguez’s PED punishment and the role that the “best interest” power could play).
83
Tayler W. Tibbitts, Sports Consumers: Ticket-Holding Fans’ Rights in Light of “Spursgate,” 21 SPORTS
L. J. 201, 204 (2014).
84
Id.
85
See generally 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2020).
86
F.T.C. v. Affiliate Strategies, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1104 (D. Kan. 2011).
87
F.T.C. v. Gill, 265 F.3d 944, 950 (9th Cir. 2001).
88
Orkin Exterminating Co. v. F.T.C., 849 F.2d 1354, 1363 (11th Cir. 1988).
89
Richard Craswell, The Identification of Unfair Acts and Practices by the Federal Trade Commission,
1981 WIS. L. REV. 107, 115 (1981).
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deciding whether to wield its authority:90 Whether an act or practice “(1) caused
consumers, competitors, or other businesses substantial injury; (2) offended
public policy as established by statute, the common law, or otherwise; and (3)
was immoral, unethical, or unscrupulous.”91 In determining whether an act or
practice is unfair, the FTC may “consider established public policies as evidence
to be considered along with all other evidence,” but may not serve as the primary
basis for such determination.92 There must still be a showing that the act or
practice alleged to have caused the injury is unfair under a “well-established
legal standard, whether grounded in statute, the common law, or the
Constitution.”93
There are two related doctrines that appear in a Section 5 analysis: the
unfairness doctrine and the deception doctrine.94 This section will analyze both
doctrines and will provide the black letter law that will then be applied to Part
III’s analysis of a hypothetical city facing MLB contraction. The case law is
extremely limited as applicable to the issue addressed by this article. However,
that does not mean an analysis may not be undertaken. There are examples
within case law that may be extracted in order to aid in Part III’s analysis. Thus,
in an effort to demonstrate how a current analysis over unfair and deceptive
trade practice claims would play out, it is necessary to look selectively at facts,
in addition to the black letter law, that may shed light on Section 5’s
applicability in a challenge brought by minor league baseball cities.
A. The Unfairness Doctrine
The FTC has identified four separate circumstances in which the act or
practice by the seller is inherently unfair: “(a) withholding material information,
(b) making unsubstantiated advertising claims, (c) depriving consumers of
various post-purchase rights, and (d) using various high-pressure sales
techniques.”95 The most frequent category of practices found by the FTC to be
unfair, and most material to the issue at focus in this article, involves a seller
withholding material information.96 A finding of unfairness under this category
focuses on the benefits of information in improving the market’s performance,
“regardless of whether consumers who lacked that information could said to be
deceived.”97 In essence, the failure to disclose material information amounts to
unfairness if consumers currently lack the information, which may be
90

LabMD, Inc. v. F.T.C., 894 F.3d 1221, 1228 (11th Cir. 2018).
Id.
92
15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2020); See LabMD, 849 F.3d at 1129 n.24.
93
Id.
94
See infra Parts II.A., II.B.
95
Craswell, supra note 89, at 108–09.
96
Id. at 116.
97
Id. at 117.
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accomplished through direct evidence or testimony, if consumers would choose
differently if better informed, and if the benefits of better consumer decisions
and improved seller performance are not outweighed by the costs of supplying
the information.98
Specific to the topic at issue in this article, if an act or practice is not
inherently unfair due to the withholding material information, then an analysis
must be undertaken to identify whether the particular act or practice is unfair
pursuant to Section 5. For the purpose of analysis, it will be assumed that the
facts at issue do not amount to being inherently unfair in order to demonstrate
the applicability of an unfairness doctrine under Section 5. In an unfairness
analysis, proof of intent, negligence, fraud, consumer reliance, or proof of injury
is not required to establish that a particular act or practice is unfair.99 For the
FTC to justify a finding of unfairness, the injury must satisfy three tests.100 The
first test recognizes that the injury must be substantial.101 In most cases,
substantial injury would involve monetary harm, as emotional impact and other
more subjective types of harm ordinarily would not make a practice unfair.102
Yet, sometimes, an injury may be sufficiently substantial if it raises a significant
risk of concrete harm.103 Although unfairness claims normally “involve actual
and completed harms,” they may also be brought on the basis of likely injury,
or foreseeable future injury, rather than actual present injury.104
In the second test, the injury must not be outweighed by any countervailing
benefits to consumers or competition that the allegedly unfair practice
produces.105 The FTC will not find a practice to have unfairly injured consumers
unless it is injurious in its net effects, thus making a single, isolated instance of

98

Id. at 119, 123.
F.T.C. v. Freecom Commc’ns, Inc., 401 F.3d 1192, 1203 (10th Cir. 2005); Michael Flynn, “The Lie, the
Bigger Lie, and the Biggest Lie” –Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices of TripAdvisor and Other Online
Review Websites, 36 J.L. & COM. 23, 30-31 (2017).
100
F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 244 (3rd Cir. 2015).
101
Id.
102
Am. Fin. Serv. Ass’n v. F.T.C., 767 F.2d 957, 972 (D.C. Cir. 1985); See also Orkin Exterminating Co.
v. F.T.C., 849 F.2d 1354, 1364-65 (11th Cir. 1988) (finding that harm from defendant’s unilateral increase in
prices, previously specified in contracts as fixed annual renewal fees, violated the terms of the contract in that
customers were charged with increased costs of services previously bargained for and the loss of certainty of
fixed prices, thus satisfying the first prong of the unfairness doctrine’s requirement of a substantial injury);
Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d at 245, (“A company does not act equitably wen it publishes a privacy
policy to attract customers who are concerned about data privacy, fails to make good on that promise by
investing inadequate resources in cybersecurity, exposes its unsuspecting customers to substantial injury, and
retains the profits of their business”).
103
Am. Fin. Serv. Ass’n, 767 F.2d at 972 (explaining that a concrete injury is found when an injury actually
exists or if there is a real chance of harm).
104
Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d at 246 (quoting In the Matter of Int’l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C.
949, 1061 (1984)).
105
Id. at 244.
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harm incapable for a finding of unfair injury.106 This turns into a cost-benefit
analysis, one in which the FTC weighs the potential costs that the proposed
remedy would impose on the parties and society in general against the overall
benefit that may be experienced by such remedies.107
Finally, the third test undertaken by the FTC in an unfairness analysis hinges
on whether the injury is one that consumers could not have reasonably
avoided.108 A consequence is “reasonably avoidable” if people not only
understand the physical steps needed to be taken in order to prevent it, but also
whether they understand the necessity of actually taking those steps. 109 This
focus on a consumer’s ability to reasonably avoid injury has developed from the
FTC’s general reliance on free and informed consumer choice that stems from
the availability of all relevant, material information thus making such
information the best regulator of the market.110 If consumers have a reason to
anticipate any impending harm they may act to avoid injury, should they have
the means to; otherwise, they may seek subsequent mitigation.111
With the three tests conducted by the FTC in an unfairness analysis outlined,
focus will now shift to the second way the FTC may find a specific act or
practice to be in violation of the FTCA: the deceptive doctrine.
B. The Deceptive Doctrine
Under Section 5 deception is present either if the seller affirmatively
misrepresents the product to consumers, or if the product differs materially from
the consumers’ reasonable expectations about the product and the seller fails to
disclose that difference.112 Misrepresentations of material facts made for the
purpose of inducing consumers to purchase services or products form the basis
of unfair or deceptive trade practices prohibited under Section 5.113 While there
is some overlap between both the unfairness and the deceptive doctrines, there
is one distinct difference: “A practice is deceptive when the consumer is forced
to bear a larger risk than expected” (i.e., the consumer believes one outcome
106
Am. Fin. Serv. Ass’n, 767 F.2d at 975; See also Orkin Exterminating Co., 849 F.2d at 1365 (stating that
the FTC has noted that acts or practices may result in a “mixture of both beneficial and adverse
consequences”).
107
Am. Fin. Serv. Ass’n., 767 F.2d at 975; See also Orkin Exterminating Co. Inc., 849 F.2d at 1365 (holding
that the second prong of the unfairness doctrine was met when defendant’s increase in fee was not
accompanied by an increase in the level or quality of service provided).
108
Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d at 244.
109
Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc., 849 F.2d at 1366 (quoting In the Matter of Int’l Harvester Co., 104
F.T.C. at 1066).
110
Id. at 1365.
111
See id. at 1365-1366 (stating that anticipatory avoidance was not possible because neither defendant nor
contracts gave any indication renewal fees would increase, and that mitigation was not possible because
accommodation program was only available to customers who complained about increases in renewal fees).
112
Craswell, supra note 89, at 116-17.
113
F.T.C. v. E.M.A. Nationwide, Inc., 767 F.3d 611, 630 (6th Cir. 2014).
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will occur and is misled, thus bringing about an outcome the consumer did not
expect upon entering into the purchase agreement), “whereas a practice is unfair
when the consumer is forced to bear a larger risk than an efficient market would
require,” (i.e., a normal level of risk allotted to consumers in a freely operating
economy).114 In other words, when a consumer is misled, there will be a finding
for deception, rather than unfairness, in the trade practice or act.115 “[T]he
‘cardinal factor' in determining whether an act or practice is deceptive under §5
is the likely [net] effect the promotor’s handiwork will have on the mind of the
ordinary consumer.”116 The more influence the promotor/seller has over the
decision of the reasonable consumer to that consumer’s detriment, the more
likely there will be a finding that the trade practice or act is considered
deceptive. Thus, at the heart of a deception case lies the central inquiry of
whether the seller, either explicitly or implicitly, made false or misleading
claims, or whether consumers were left with incorrect expectations after the
purchase agreement has been validated.117 Additionally, the FTC will find that
ambiguous, confusing, or even inconsistent statements have the tendency or
capacity to deceive.118
To prove that an act or practice is deceptive in violation of Section 5, the
FTC must prove that there was a representation, omission, or practice, which is
likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances, and
such a representation, omission, or practice is material.119 Intent to deceive is
not a required element for a finding of deception under Section 5; it is sufficient
that the representations or practices were likely to mislead consumers acting
reasonably under similar circumstances.120 Furthermore, although proof of
actual deception is not necessary to establish that the practice or act is in
“violation of Section 5, such proof is highly probative to show that [it] is likely
to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances.”121
For the purposes of this article, only a representation and an omission are
relevant and will be discussed. A “representation” is defined as “a statement or
account made to influence opinion or action.”122 An “omission” is “something
[that is] neglected or left undone.”123 Thus, for a finding that a representation
was made in satisfaction of the first factor of the deceptive doctrine, one must
only show that a statement was made that influenced the recipient of the
Am. Fin. Serv. Ass’n v. F.T.C., 767 F.2d 957, 979 n.27 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
Id.
116
F.T.C. v. Affiliate Strategies, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1104 (D. Kan. 2011).
117
Craswell, supra note 89, at 117.
118
Michael Flynn, “You Know, It’s Just Marketing” – Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices in Car Dealer
Buy-Back Offers, 42 U. DAYTON L. REV. 11, 18 (2017).
119
F.T.C. v. Moses, 913 F.3d 297, 306 (2d Cir. 2019).
120
F.T.C. v. Verity Intern., Ltd., 443 F.3d 48, 63 (2d Cir. 2006).
121
F.T.C. v. USA Financial, LLC, 415 Fed. Appx. 970, 973 (11th Cir. 2011).
122
Representation, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2011).
123
Omission, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2011).
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representation. For an omission to occur, there must be something of substance
that was not included or left out, either intentionally or otherwise.
“In demonstrating that a representation is likely to mislead, the FTC must
establish that (1) such a representation was false or (2) [that] the advertiser
lacked a reasonable basis for its claims.”124 Courts will find that a representation
had a reasonable basis if it had some “recognizable substantiation for the
representation prior to making it.”125 An omission is likely to mislead
consumers if its inclusion would have properly informed the reasonable
consumer about certain risks associated that would have otherwise been
unknown before entering into an agreement with the seller, but was left off to
induce the sale to the seller’s benefit.
A representation is material if a reasonable prospective consumer is likely to
rely on the representation, thus making it likely to affect the consumer’s decision
to purchase a product or service.126 The same goes for an omission. In this same
light, “a solicitation may be likely to mislead by virtue of the net impression” it
creates, even if there are certain truthful disclosures contained within. 127
Further, “[a] representation does not become ‘false and deceptive’ merely
because it will be unreasonably misunderstood by an insignificant and
unrepresentative segment of the class of persons to whom the representation is
addressed.”128
While proof of consumer reliance is not required for a finding that a practice
or act violates Section 5, it is necessary to establish the consumer’s right to
redress.129 In that instance, to raise a presumption of reliance, the FTC need
only show “the business entity made material misrepresentations likely to
deceive consumers, . . . those misrepresentations were widely disseminated, and
. . . consumers purchased the entity’s products.”130
Having now gone through an explanation of the black letter, along with
seeing examples in case law for how courts have navigated both the unfairness
124

F.T.C. v. John Beck Amazing Profits, LLC, 865 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1067 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
Id.
126
F.T.C. v. NPB Advert., Inc., 218 F. Supp. 3d 1352, 1358 (M.D. Fla. 2016); F.T.C. v. E.M.A. Nationwide,
Inc., 767 F.3d 611, 631 (6th Cir. 2014); see also F.T.C. v. Verity Intern., Ltd., 443 F.3d 48, 63 (2d Cir. 2006)
(finding that defendants engaged in “representation of uncontestability” when they caused subscribers to
receive explicit and implicit representations regarding the inability to avoid charges for the download of a
program used to purchase adult entertainment); F.T.C. v. Medlab, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1081 (N.D. Cal.
2009) (stating that the representations were material because they addressed “critical information intended to
affect consumers’ choice to purchase defendants’ product”).
127
F.T.C. v. Cyberspace.Com LLC, 453, F.3d 1196, 1200 (9th Cir. 2006); see also E.M.A. Nationwide,
Inc., 767 F.3d at 633 (finding that scripts used by defendants to solicit consumers in initial phone calls
consisted “almost entirely” of material representations which actually induced consumers into purchasing
defendants’ services at high costs, even though there were truthful disclosures buried in subsequent
communications).
128
Andrew Serwin, The Federal Trade Commission and Privacy: Defining Enforcement and Encouraging
the Adoption of Best Practices, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 809, 824 (2011).
129
E.M.A. Nationwide, Inc., 767 F.3d at 631 n.12.
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Id.
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and the deceptive doctrines, this article will now shift to Part III’s application to
a hypothetical city facing MLB contraction to weigh the likelihood of that city
having a legitimate claim against MLB.
III. STEPPING UP TO THE PLATE
The following facts will be pertinent to Part III’s analysis: The city of Alpha
has been in talks with MLB to bring a MiLB team, that played last season in the
city of Bravo, into town, as it is something the city believes will be a positive
addition and a boost to the economy since its last team’s departure several years
ago.131 Because the stadium is not currently suited to MLB’s liking for MiLB
play in Alpha, city leadership has been informed by MLB that an extensive
overhaul of the existing stadium and facilities will be required in order for the
team to come and play its games therein. Because of this, Alpha must pour
finances into the reconstruction of the stadium site in compliance with MLB’s
request, even when MLB keeps pushing more additions to the stadium site that
increase costs for Alpha. MLB has approved designs submitted by city
leadership and has repeatedly given assurances to Alpha that, following
adherence to these approved plans, Alpha will acquire a MiLB team and be able
to market the team as an MLB affiliate. Unbeknownst to Alpha, however, the
team originally located in Bravo is one of the forty-two set to lose MLB
affiliation through contraction. While contraction is not a certainty, there is
widespread internal belief through the MLB that contraction is inevitable, with
a concurrent plan for its execution in development.
Because Section 5 of the FTCA is, “phrased in the disjunctive, prohibiting
‘unfair or deceptive’ acts or practices,” the FTC is not required to prove
violation under both the unfairness and deceptive doctrine in order to obtain
relief.132 Once one has been proven, the FTC has met its burden. However, for
the sake of argument in this article, both doctrines will be applied to the facts.
A. The Unfairness Doctrine Applied
In analyzing the most frequent category of practices found by the FTC to be
unfair, withholding material information, the central focus of this article meets
the legal threshold determined by the FTC through previous challenges. Here,
city officials currently lack the critical information that the team from Bravo
they are looking to bring to the city is one of the forty-two proposed for
contraction. This may be easily achieved through direct evidence via emails,
text messages, proposals, etc., that will prove MLB never divulged information
131
The previous team that played in Alpha had no MLB affiliation, and is considered a part of the
Independent League. As such, the stadium has limited capacity and lackluster facilities for training.
132
F.T.C. v. Verity Intern., Ltd., 443 F.3d 48, 65 (2d Cir. 2006) (emphasis in original).

VIVERITO– ARTICLE 31.1

12/17/2020 8:51 PM

2020] MINOR L EAGUE CIT IES & FT CA SECT ION 5 CL AIMS 103
that the incoming team was up for contraction. There is no doubt that city
officials in Alpha would choose differently had they been informed. As has
been demonstrated earlier in this article, the costs associated with stadium
construction and maintenance are high. City officials have the difficult task in
appropriating funds throughout different projects and causes within. Had they
been informed of the inevitable contraction of their team, the money allocated
for stadium construction would undoubtedly have been reallocated to other
areas in Alpha. Lastly, the costs of supplying the information does not outweigh
the benefits of better consumer decisions and improved seller performance.
Supplying this information simply means making Alpha city officials aware that
the team they are taking on is facing contraction, which would unquestionably
bring about a better decision for them in deciding how to allocate funds.
However, simply stating that this issue fits the mold of the most frequent
category of practices found to be unfair would not be wise, as courts have been
known to be unpredictable. Thus, further analysis will be conducted under the
unfairness doctrine to reinforce the idea that the acts or practices on MLB’s part
are considered unfair pursuant to Section 5 of the FTCA.
Applying the first test under the unfairness doctrine, which necessitates that
the injury suffered be substantial, it is clear that Alpha’s harm meets this
threshold. As has been stated in this article, the construction of stadiums for
MiLB consistently requires tremendous capital contribution from cities.
Because, in most cases, substantial injury involves monetary harm, the monetary
commitment made by Alpha towards the redesign and reconstruction of its
stadium meant for MiLB play is no simple waste. This is capital that could have
otherwise been applied to other projects or causes in the city, but is no longer
available because of its waste on a stadium that will no longer house a MiLB
team.
On the contrary view, while the money may be found to not have been
wasted, thus calling into question the validity of the substantial injury threshold,
one must contemplate the overall effect of losing a MiLB team. However, since
an unfairness claim may also be brought on the basis of likely harm, as opposed
to actual harm, there is likely harm Alpha will suffer vis-à-vis its return on
investment. The draw of a MiLB team is seeing your team’s prized prospects
play and develop before they are called up to big league action. MiLB games
also provide out-of-market fans the opportunity to see veteran players who may
be with the team for a rehab assignment before they are declared healthy and
suited for a return to their big-league ball club. Once inside the stadium, fans
purchase food and beverage, as well as visit gift shops to player apparel of
aspiring big leaguers. Further, drawing in fans to the stadium may become
more, as families may decide to make a weekend trip out of it and spend time in
the nearby downtown center of the city, where they will purchase lodging,
meals, and pursue further entertainment, thus contributing further to the city’s
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economy. Take these crucial components of MiLB away and the draw is not
the same for an independent league team.
Accordingly, because Alpha must contribute capital to the redesign and
reconstruction of its stadium to meet MLB’s standard for a MiLB affiliated team
to play its games therein, the actual or likely harm Alpha will be subject to,
should MLB contract the promised team, is substantial enough to satisfy the
threshold established by the first test under the unfairness doctrine.
Next, the injury to Alpha is not outweighed by any countervailing benefits
to consumers or competition that contraction produces. MLB contraction would
be injurious in its net effects due to the harm that comes not only to the city for
lost capital, but for other industries around the city. The money that was devoted
to the redesign and reconstruction of Alpha’s stadium site could have been
allocated to other causes within the city, such as public works, education, law
enforcement, etc. Fans that would be in town taking in a ball game would no
longer be there to venture out into the downtown area and spend their money.
This harms not only Alpha’s treasury, but all those who rely on the several
different industries that enable a city to operate and generate revenue.
Along the same thinking, a cost-benefit analysis turns in favor of Alpha, as
well. The detriment experienced by the city and those relying on essential
services and maintenance far outweighs the benefit experienced by MLB upon
contraction. Citizens of Alpha would experience tax increases to recover lost
funds and profit expected from having an affiliated team playing its games in
the city. Thus, Alpha can be said to have satisfied the second test under the
unfairness doctrine in that there are no countervailing benefits to Alpha and its
citizens as a result of MLB contraction.
In the final test under the unfairness doctrine, the FTC must prove that Alpha
could not have reasonably avoided or mitigated the injury. There appears to be
no issue proving that Alpha could not have reasonably avoided injury in this
instance. The harm comes from losing a team with MLB affiliation, the draw
such a team brings to the stadium, and the money spent by those crowds and
generated from advertising. This draw is unique to MiLB due to, as explained
above, the irreplaceable opportunity fans get to see some of their favorite players
and potential superstars for their clubs. The hypothetical facts indicate that
MLB is actively working on a plan of execution for contraction, and that Alpha
has no indication it is even in jeopardy of losing the team. Had Alpha been
informed of the possibility of contraction, the city would have been free to
contemplate its move – whether to undertake the overhaul of the stadium in
hopes that another team would come along, or redirect those funds elsewhere to
other needs in the community.
There is an argument for MLB that Alpha has the ability to subsequently
mitigate their potential loses by bringing on another team to fill the stadium.
While this is true, the extent of mitigation does not allow Alpha to recoup its
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investment and projected profits that come from having an affiliated team in the
city. As was shown earlier in this article, there is a drastic difference between
attendance and, consequently, revenue between an independent league team and
an MLB affiliated MiLB team. There would be no immediate impact of
mitigation from an unaffiliated team felt by Alpha. Thus, it is possible for Alpha
to show that the injury resulting from MLB contraction could not reasonably be
avoided.
This section has shown that, while admittedly fact specific, it is possible for
the FTC to bring a claim on behalf of Alpha under the unfairness doctrine of
Section 5 FTCA for unfair or deceptive trade practices. Now, the focus of this
article will shift to an analysis under the second doctrine so provided by the
federal statute.
B. The Deceptive Doctrine Applied
There is no question that MLB is making a representation to Alpha through
its communications. Much like the Verity International Ltd. court found that
defendants engaged in explicit and implicit representations, there is no question
here that MLB has made explicit representations to Alpha regarding the
guarantee of an affiliated team pending stadium redesign and reconstruction.
Thus, a representation has been made.
This representation is likely to mislead Alpha’s city officials because of its
falsity, in addition to it being made without a reasonable basis with some
recognizable substantiation for the representation.
According to the
hypothetical facts, there is a widely held belief internally at MLB that
contraction is inevitable to the point that there is a plan currently in motion for
its execution. In stating that Alpha is guaranteed a team if they adhere to the
approved plans for stadium redesign and reconstruction, the representation
MLB is making is false and without any reasonable basis. Thus, the
representation is likely to mislead.
Furthermore, this representation is material because it affects Alpha’s
decision to proceed with the overhaul of its current stadium in reliance on
MLB’s assurances that doing so will yield in the award of an affiliated team.
Absent these assurances, there is no telling whether Alpha would have
proceeded with dedicating funds to a stadium overhaul, rather than dedicating
those funds to other projects around the city.
MLB is being deceptive in that Alpha is being forced to bear a larger risk of
recouping its investment and projected profits in the absence of having a MiLB
team play its games in the city. There is no telling whether a new team will
even be formed or come to Alpha in place of the MLB-promised MiLB team,
making it a possibility that the stadium sits idly with no occupant, resulting in
serious financial loss to Alpha. Thus, in light of the facts of this hypothetical,
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MLB contraction meets the standards set forth in the deceptive doctrine under a
Section 5 FTCA analysis for unfair or deceptive trade practices.
CONCLUSION
Through an application of the facts, it has been illustrated how a city can
prevail on a FTCA Section 5 claim for unfair or deceptive acts or trade practices.
The applicability of the statute to a hypothetical scenario was the goal of this
article, and that goal has been achieved. It must be noted, however, that the
applicability of Section 5 of the FTCA is very fact-specific and will not apply
to every similar situation. Further, what was not discussed is the damages cities
can expect after prevailing on a Section 5 claim. Stated earlier, the primary
purpose of Section 5 of the FTCA is the protection of the consumer public.
Apart from the diamond and the bright lights, baseball is still a business, and
should be treated as such. As such, that makes fans and cities lobbying to bring
in team consumers. Even in the game of baseball, the FTC can leave its impact
and protect the “little guy” against MLB and its economically driven directives.
What this means for cities is that there is a potential for relief in the face of
MLB contraction that cities will have at their disposal, should MLB make its
ultimate decision and contract forty-two minor league teams. However, given
the current state of the sports in the world amid the novel Covid-19 pandemic,
the primary focus of leagues is on the re-start of professional, major league-level
competition. So, while the possibility, or even inevitability, or MLB contraction
of the minor leagues remains an issue that will have drastic effects, the focus for
not only sports, but the world as a whole, is to slowly heal and return to a state
of normalcy. For minor league cities, there is hope amidst the chaos.

